Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium on Professional
Negligence

Article 20

6-1959

Book Reviews
Robert B. Looper
Ralph Slovenko

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert B. Looper and Ralph Slovenko, Book Reviews, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 962 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/20

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
CASES AND MATERIALS ON

RESTITUTION. By John W. Wade.'

Brooklyn:

The Foundation Press, Inc., 1958. Pp. xxxi, 903. $11.00.
Restitution is a subject in which controversy and imprecision begin
on the title page. A considerable proportion of the subject has long
been taught in American law schools, masquerading under such titles
as "Quasi-Contracts," "Equity," "Remedies," and the like. The term
"Restitution" as a designation for a separate field of law is relatively
new, dating back only to 1937 when the American Law Institute published the Restatement of Restitution.2 Until a relatively recent period
the subject matter now assembled under the generic term "Restitution" was not dealt with as a unit by law writers or law schools,
but was considered piecemeal under other rubrics. But it is now generally recognized that, however diverse may be the situations included
within the field, there is a predominant purpose which the law serves
in actions of restitution and that there are principles which run
through the entire subject, so that it is entitled to be regarded as a
distinct branch of the law.
The law of civil obligations may be viewed as a tripartite structure
-divided into tort, contract, and restitution. The three divisions serve
different functions: (a) The law of contract enforces promises. The
postulate of the law of contract is that a person is entitled to receive
what another has promised him. It protects the expectation interest.
(b) The law of tort provides compensation for harm. Its postulate
is the protection of the security interest. (c) Then there is a third
postulate, sometimes overlapping the others, but different in its purpose, viz., the postulate that a person has a right to have restored to
him an unjust benefit gained at his expense by another. Restitution,
then, is the third estate of the private law of obligations.
This excellent casebook by Dean Wade is organized-like most of
its predecessors in the field 3-according to a scheme which catalogues
the various situations in which a right to restitution may arise, i.e.,
*

Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Illinois.

1. Dean, School of Law, Vanderbilt University.
2. The reporters for this Restatement were Professors Warren A. Seavey
and Austin W. Scott.
3. The main predecessors were THURSTON, CASES ON RESTITUTION (1940)
and Durfee & Dawson, CASES ONTREMEDIES-RESTITUTION AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY (1939). This latter work has just appeared in a new edition, Dawson
& Palmer, CASES ON RESTITUTION (1958). The seminal casebook in this field
was 3 COOK, CASES ON EQUITY (REFORMATION, RESCISSION AND RESTITUTION)
(2d ed. 1932).
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the various ways in which an "unjust benefit" may be conferred or
acquired. Thus the book is organized into six chapters:
1. Introduction
2. Benefits Voluntarily Conferred
3. Benefits Conferred Under Legal Compulsion
4. Benefits Acquired Through Wrongful Conduct
5. Benefits Conferred in Performance of an Agreement
6. Benefits Obtained Through Mistake
The introductory chapter gives a key to the distinctive emphasis of
the book, an emphasis on the procedural aspects-the remedies available and the results which they accomplish. Here the reader may
catch a threshold glimpse of the varied arsenal of legal and equitable
remedies for restitutionary relief: assumpsit, the constructive trust,
the equitable lien, subrogation, equitable accounting. The historical
background of the rise of indebitatus assumpsit is given fairly brief
treatment: the Introductory Note to the Restatement plus Lord Mans4
field's classic opinion in Moses v. Macferlan. But enough is here to
suggest the truth of Sir Henry Maine's famous aphorism: "So great
is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts
of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure." 5
The second chapter, dealing with "Benefits Voluntarily Conferred"
without mistake, depicts (in less than fifty pages) the direct clash
between the principle of restitution for unjust enrichment and the
principle that no person should be forced to pay for a benefit thrust
upon him. In the common law system the second principle has generally prevailed. This result is achieved by three doctrinal techniques:
abusive epithet ("officiousness"), evasive ambiguity ("volunteer"),
and fictional presumption ("presumption of gratuity"). The cases
show this area to be one of the most unsatisfactory in the whole field
of Restitution. One wonders whether the Civil Law (in its doctrine of
negotiorum gestio) does not have a better answer to the basic question: to what extent should the legal system approve unsolicited intervention in another's affairs, by awarding restitution for benefits
6
thus conferred?
The third chapter, "Benefits Conferred Under Legal Compulsion,"
is a separate treatment of a topic usually lumped with duress and
undue influence under the general heading of "Coercion." Here money
or other property is paid under compulsion of a judgment. It now
turns out that the judgment creditor had "no right" to the money.
4. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
5. MInE, Axci ET LAW 389 (1861).

6. The doctrine of negotiorum gestio is illustrated in the casebook by the
Louisiana case of Police Jury v. Hampton, p. 44.
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Can the judgment debtor get restitution? Or alternatively it turns out
that payment of the judgment has conferred a benefit on a third
party by extinguishing his liability to the judgment creditor. Can
the judgment debtor get contribution or indemnity from the third
party? The short selection of cases here suggests the doctrinal intracacies without by any means exhausting the topic or the reader.
The fourth chapter, "Benefits Acquired Through Wrongful Conduct," groups together cases of theft or embezzlement, where there
is no contract, with cases of fraud or duress, where there is a contract
between the parties. Here restitution may serve a compensatory
function, and thus the remedy considerably overlaps into the field
of tort. It is obvious, for example, that the tort actions of replevin and
trover are in substance restitutionary. Many of the cases in this
chapter are classified in the old books under the delusive rubric
"waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit."
In general one can say that, despite the overlap, the restitutionary
remedy differs from the tort remedy in two basic respects: (a) The
concept of fault has no central place in the law of restitution. Quasicontractual liability, like contractual liability, is normally liability
without fault, although of course it may arise from tortious conduct
in which there is fault. (b) The measure of recovery in restitution
is not loss to the plaintiff (as in tort), but benefit to the defendant
(however artificially this "benefit" may be defined).
Restitution also overlaps into the field of Contract. Chapter 5
deals with this area and is entitled "Benefits Conferred in Performance of an Agreement." Perhaps the main work of Restitution is done
in the field of express contract, awarding value restitution of performances rendered in actual or supposed conformity with contractual
obligations. This chapter deals with that great variety of cases in
which recovery on the contract itself is not permitted, because of
breach, non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds, impossibility,
illegality or defective capacity.
But here again note that, despite the overlap, there are two basic
differences: (a) The law of contract protects the expectation interest,
whereas the law' of restitution normally protects only the reliance
interest, and then only such elements of reliance as result in enrichment of the other party. (b) Unlike contractual obligations, which
are consensual in origin, the obligation to make restitution is imposed by law irrespective of the will of the obligor. In this respect,
of course, it is like the tort obligation.
The last chapter of the book deals with "Benefits Obtained Through
Mistake," the most difficult and confused subject in the law of Restitution, perhaps in all of the law of obligations. The cases here are
concerned with those complex conditions under which there is a
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right to restitution because of a mistake in the conferring of a benefit.
There is, of course, no universal rule that one who makes a mistake
in the conferring of a benefit is entitled to restitution. Where the
mistake is induced by fraud, relief is almost universally granted.
But aside from the fraud cases, many policy factors influence the
availability of the restitutionary remedy. Here, as elsewhere in the
law of Restitution, the unjust enrichment formula is a principle and
not a rule.
What of the selection of cases used to illustrate these various problems? It is here that Dean Wade has made his greatest contribution
to the profession, for the originality of this casebook lies not so much
in the organization of materials as in the selection of materials. One
must remember that the collection of a group of cases in Restitution
is no ordinary scissors-and-paste job. Restitution, alas, is a term unknown to legal treatises, encyclopedias and digests. The subject is
not conveniently indexed. No digest heading brings together its precedents. They are scattered from Abandonment to Zoning, and only
the practiced eye can pick them out. In the current judicial decisions
applying restitution doctrines, only a minority of courts label them
precisely, and for this reason one has difficulty in recognizing restitution decisions under their many disguises. The task which Dean
Wade undertook was therefore one of considerable difficulty, and his
achievement commands the highest admiration.
Of the 220 cases included in the book about half post-date the appearance of the Restatement, and many of these recent cases in fact
quote the Restatement. This judicial reliance upon American Law
Institute black letter law was rather surprising to me, because I
have generally found the Restatement of Restitution rather unhelpful. But perhaps this is only to say that it is not a handy teaching
device.
English cases are conspicuous by their relative absence: only nine
7
are included here, and these are mainly the well-known classics.
Since the English courts are decidedly behind the American courts
in formulating a systematic corpus of restitution doctrine,8 this paucity of English authority is perhaps not surprising.
The test of a casebook, of course, is in the teaching; for however
valuable a collection of such materials may be as a reference work
to the practitioner (particularly in an emerging field such as this),
7.Moses v. Macferlan, p. 4; The FibrosaCase, p. 539; Sinclair v. Brougham,
p. 638; Lady Hood of Avalon v. MacKinnon, p. 845; Holt v. Markham, p. 872.
8. "Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago," said Lord Sumner in
Baylis v. Bishop of London, (1913) 1 Ch. 140, "we are not now free in the
twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes
attractively styled justice as between man and man." Thus was repudiated
Lord Mansfield's broad concept of assumpsit as an action for the prevention
of unjust enrichment.
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it is primarily designed as a teaching tool for students. How does
this work fare in the crucible of the classroom? My own experience
is this: I have taught Restitution out of three different casebooks, but
most recently out of the Wade casebook, and find it not only most
to my liking but indeed a superlative teaching tool. The old favorites
are here. 9 But many sprightly new cases,' 0 adroitly chosen for their
human interest, enliven the book and animate class discussion.
The textual notes in the book are severely subordinated to the
case materials, which again I find to my liking." Written with complete economy of expression, Dean Wade's scholarly comments have
only a delicate tincture of erudition, and therefore never become oppressive. The long string of citations, so characteristic of modern
casebook annotation, is avoided.
Every reviewer is supposed to find at least one flaw in the book
under scrutiny, and urge its correction in a later edition. Dean Wade
and the Foundation Press have been most inconsiderate of reviewers
in this respect. But I have found a linguistic impropriety in a note
on page 177, which is perhaps a lapsus linguae or only a misprint.
This is the reference to "intraspousal tort immunity." I had thought
of suggesting that, in future editions, this should be made to read
"interspousal" or perhaps "intrafamiial." But the present indelicacy
may be too good to change.
One serious suggestion I do have for the distinguished editor of this
casebook. It stems from the fact that there is no really good textbook
in the field. Keener 2 and Woodward, 13 although still cited by the
courts, are both works of considerable antiquity; and Dawson's brilliant little book 14 is only a monograph. The subject of Restitution
still awaits its Prosser. This-a good one-volume text-is a task
worthy of Dean Wade's next effort. But in the meantime one can only
be grateful for his present contribution to this important subject.
ROBERT B. LOOPER*
9. E.g., Sherwood v. Walker, p. 807; Felder v. Reeth, p. 145; Marr v.

Tumulty, p. 353; Concord Coal Co. v. Ferrin,p. 676; Vickery v. Ritchie, p. 679;
Gaffner v. American Finance Co., p. 882.

10. Hart v. E. P. Dutton (alleged fascist sues publisher to establish constructive trust on profits from libellous book), p. 169; Earl v. Saks & Co. (sugar
daddy buys fur coat for his dolly with surprising results), p. 257; Harper v.
Adametz (indomitable torts scholar Fowler Harper sues real estate broker for
secret profit made in fraud of both vendor and purchaser, court cites Harper
on Torts), p. 265; Jersey City v. Hague (Jersey City sues the infamous Frank
Hague to recover kickbacks extorted from city employees), p. 286; Latham v.
FatherDivine (intended legatee seeks to impress a constructive trust on testamentary gift to Father Divine, who was alleged to have caused death of
decedent), p. 322.
11. Although this book is labeled "Cases and Materials," it sticks pretty
much to the classic Langdell pattern and eschews the modem trend toward
the monumental casebook-treatise.
12. KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS (1893).
13. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913).
14. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951).
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EQUAL JQSTICE FOR Tm AccusED. By a Special Committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York and The National Legal
Aid Association. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Pp. 144. $3.50.
As Judge Learned Hand once put it, a democratic society cannot
afford to "ration justice." Equal Justice for the Accused is a careful
report of what has been done and what remains to be done to achieve
equal treatment under law for poor persons charged with crime. There
is nothing particularly new in the findings and suggestions of this
study, for they have been made many times before, but they gain
authority in this presentation, the product of a diverse and qualified
group which has thoroughly investigated the problem. This report
grows out of the work, which was financed by the Fund for the
Republic, of a joint committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
The report is divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of
chapters 1-3, is called "Representation of Indigent Defendants: The
Necessity, the Past, and the Present." Chapter 1 deals with the
necessity for representation. Chapter 2 looks into the history of
defender systems and concludes with a discussion of the causes of the
growth of voluntary- and public-defender systems. Chapter 3 considers the present methods of affording representation. In most of
the communities which provide free legal services,' counsel is assigned
by the courts, generally without compensation for services and often
without reimbursement for expenses. In other communities, defender
services are offered through private (non-governmental) legal aid
societies or through a public defender who is selected non-politically
and compensated for his services out of tax revenues. A few places
employ a "mixed private-public system" in which control is nonpolitical and substantial fractions of the necessary funds come from
both private and public sources.
The second part of the report, consisting of chapters 4-7, contains
the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee. Chapter 4
sets forth the six basic standards which the Committee considers are
of primary significance in evaluating defender systems. They are:
1. It appears that the states under the Fourteenth Amendment are required,
as a minimum, to furnish counsel in "serious" non-capital felony cases as well
as in capital cases. See Slovenko, Representation for Indigent Defendants,
33 Tu..L. REV. 363 (1959). 1Vr. Harrison Tweed of New York, past President
of the National Legal Aid Association, states'in the Foreward to Equal Justice
for the Accused: "For more than twenty-five years I have been interested in
the efforts in different ways in various parts of the country to assure competent representation in the criminal courts for those 'who cannot afford a lawyer. What I have seen has not been calculated to bring joy to the heart of a
lawyer interested in justice and in the legal profession (p. 5).
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(1) The system should provide counsel for every indigent person who
faces the possibility of the deprivation of his liberty or other serious
criminal sanction; (2) The system should afford representation which
is experienced, competent, and zealous; (3) The system should provide
the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense;
(4) The system should come into operation at a sufficiently early
stage of the proceedings so that it can fully advise and protect and
should continue through appeal; (5) The system should assure undivided loyalty by defense counsel to the indigent defendant; and
(6) The system should enlist community participation and responsibility. In Chapter 5 each type of defender system (namely, the assigned-counsel, the voluntary-defender, the public-defender, and the
mixed private-public systems) is evaluated in terms of the standards
set forth in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6 the Committee sets forth its
recommendations which are intended to aid a community in obtaining the type of system most suitable to its character and needs. In
general, the Committee is of the opinion that the problem of legal
representation for the indigent cannot be solved through the assignedcounsel method. It considers that the assignment system as a whole
has proved a failure. The American Bar Association Journal has recently pointed out the anomalous fact that in federal courts, where
the assignment of counsel is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to
a valid trial in all felony cases, the satisfaction of the obligation to
furnish counsel is hit-or-miss, depending upon the availability of
2
free assigned counsel or upon the graces of a state legal aid society.
The report concludes in Chapter 7 with "A Look Into the Future."
The Committee's basic conclusion is that in many places in the
United States today justice is not equal and accessible for all, and
it hopes that this study will be but the beginning of a determined
effort by all segments of the community to support and extend
defender systems.
The problem of representation for indigent criminal defendants
will become more acute in the various states, in view of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which define a wide responsibility by the States for furnishing assistance for indigent criminal
defendants. Charitable contributions which sustain voluntary defender
offices may not long be relied upon for the discharge of the obligation. As demands increase, community fund authorities will become
reluctant to continue the support of what is considered by many to
3
be essentially a government obligation.
2. Williams, The Indigent Defendant: The Problem in the Light of Recent
Decisions, 45 A.B.A.J. 147 (1959); Mars, The Problem of the Indigent Accused:
Public Defenders in the Federal Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 272 (1959).
3. See Duggan, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant in Massachusetts, 2
BOSToN BAR J. 23 (No. 11, Dec. 1958).
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Although this book is not concerned with the causes of crime and
how to elininate them, it may be well to point out that representation, although full and fair, will not upset the age-old proposition
that poverty breeds crime. It will not demonstrate that penniless
persons do not commit acts of crime. Furthermore, adequate representation will not dissuade the penniless person from the commission
of crime. Curiously enough, it could well have the opposite effect
by diminishing the deterrent effect of the law.
RALPH SLOVENKO*
* Assistant

Professor, Tulane School of Law.

